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[W]omen had additional burdens to bear just because they were 
women . . . Women and girls were subjected to widespread and systematic 
sexual violence, including rape prior to execution; rape as an instrument 
of torture; rape through forced marriage; rape over an extended period of 
time; gang rapes with multiple perpetrators and mass rapes of multiple 
victims; sexual mutilation; forced nudity; and threat of rape . . . . It is also 
acknowledged that sexual crimes were most definitely also committed 
against men during this time. 
Women’s Hearing arranged by Cambodian NGOs1 
[T]he Co-Investigating Judges consider that the official [Communist Party 
of Kampuchea, or] CPK policy regarding rape was to prevent its 
occurrence and to punish the perpetrators. Despite the fact that this policy 
did not manage to prevent rape, it cannot be considered that rape was one 
of the crimes used by the CPK leaders to implement the common purpose. 
That is not the case, however, in the context of forced marriage . . . . 
These acts of rape [the imposing of consummation of forced marriages], 
by their nature or consequences, in particular through the targeting of the 
physical and physiological integrity of the victim, were part of the attack 
against the civilian population. The perpetrators knew that there was an 
attack on the civilian population and that their acts were part of it. 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia2 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Rape has long been a reality of conflict, be it internal conflict or 
international warfare.3 In the past century, however, rape in conflict 
has often been presented as developing from being an inevitable by-
      1. CAMBODIAN DEFENDERS PROJECT, REPORT ON THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
2011 WOMEN’S HEARING ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE UNDER THE KHMER ROUGE 
REGIME 3-4 (Alison Barclay & Beini Ye eds., 2012) (reporting on a non-judicial 
hearing, set up by NGOs, for women subjected to rape and sexual violence under 
the Khmer Rouge to have their stories heard). 
 2.  Case 002, Case File No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ, Closing Order, ¶¶ 
1428-31 (Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/ 
courtdoc/D427Eng.pdf. 
 3.  See e.g., Phillip Weiner, The Evolving Jurisprudence of the Crime of Rape 
in International Criminal Law, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1207, 1207-08 (2013) (referring to 
the Rwanda conflict in 1990 as an example of the use of rape in conflict).  
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product of such conflict, to an intentional and systematic means of 
perpetuating it.4 Much debate, particularly among those keen to 
promote a more feminist understanding and application of the law, 
has centered on how international tribunals, and in turn the 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”), should prosecute rape.5 This 
discourse went beyond the academic, having notable impact on the 
shaping of international law approaches to defining and prosecuting 
rape.6 Yet, as this Article explores, despite being such a core 
component of conflict, rape is rarely adequately addressed as part of 
transitional justice.7 Conceptions of rape and strategies for its 
prosecution became tied to the particular contexts of specific 
conflicts, namely Bosnia and Rwanda. But nevertheless went on to 
form the backdrop for the creation of the ICC’s Statute of 
international and thus, more general application.8 This resulted in 
subsequent tribunals, such as the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Court of Cambodia (ECCC), struggling to adapt and apply these 
approaches and definitions to rape prosecution in ways that could the 
factual variations of rape in different conflicts. Beyond these 
contextual limitations of rape intertwined with ethnicity, there are 
also broader and perhaps more systemic constraints on the 
conceptualization of rape in international law.9 
 4.  See generally Kelly D. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other 
Gender-Related Crimes Under International Law: Extraordinary Advances, 
Enduring Obstacles, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 288, 288 (2003) (discussing the 
development of rape in the context of war as gradually recognizing it as a tool of 
war).  
 5.  See e.g., Barbara Bedont & Katherine Hall-Martinez, Ending Impunity for 
Gender Crimes Under the International Criminal Court, 6 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 
65, 65-67 (1999) (discussing the treatment of women’s rights within the context of 
the ICC); Rhonda Copelon, Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes 
Against Women into International Criminal Law, 46 MCGILL L. J. 217, 239 
(2000); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rape, Genocide, and Women’s Human Rights, 
17 HARV. WOMEN’S L. J. 5, 14-15 (1994) (discussing the intersection between 
women’s rights and international law). 
 6.  See Karen Engle, Feminism and its (Dis)contents: Criminalizing Wartime 
Rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 778, 778-79, 815 (2005) 
(discussing feminism’s role in the international criminalization of rape by drawing 
on examples within Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
 7.  See infra Part IV. 
 8.  See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7, July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].  
 9.  See Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of 
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The ECCC has come late in the day to try and provide transitional 
justice for some of the many crimes committed by leaders and senior 
members of the Khmer Rouge during the 1970s.10 Hamstrung by its 
own problematic application of the principle of legality, the ECCC 
can apply the law only as it finds it to have stood at the time of the 
alleged crimes.11 Unfortunately, however, according to the ECCC, 
rape was not yet a distinct crime against humanity. This, as will be 
explained, is not the only legal stumbling block in the prosecution of 
rape at the ECCC.12 Despite being barred by the principle of nellum 
crimen sin lege from prosecuting rape qua rape, the ECCC is still 
able use acts of rape as the actus reus for other indictments, namely 
the crime against humanity of other inhumane acts.13 But, once 
again, the ECCC construes such a narrow reading of the law as to 
impede itself from prosecuting a great number of rapes as other 
inhumane acts.14 
This Article will begin by exploring why the ECCC has held that 
only rape in the context of forced marriage can be charged as the 
crime against humanity of other inhumane acts and in doing so, has 
created a problematic division among the many instances of rape that 
occurred under the Khmer Rouge regime.15 More fundamentally, the 
ECCC’s prosecutions of rape, or rather lack thereof, provide a useful 
lens through which to analyze and assess the transitional 
jurisprudence that has developed around rape in conflict in recent 
decades. Even with the offense of rape qua rape now recognized as a 
Democratic Kampuchea, art. 5, Oct. 27, 2004, NS/RKM/1004/006 [hereinafter 
Law on the Establishment of the ECCC]; see also Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 5, May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1159 
[hereinafter ICTY Statute]; see also Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 7. 
 10.  See Case 001, Case File No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Judgement, ¶ 1 
(July 26, 2010), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/ 
20100726_Judgement_Case_001_ENG_PUBLIC.pdf (entering a judgment over 
thirty years later).  
 11.  See Law on the Establishment of the ECCC, supra note 9, at arts. 2-3 
(including amendments as promulgated on October 27, 2004).  
 12.  See infra Part III. 
 13.  See Case 001, Case File No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC, Appeal 
Judgement, ¶¶ 207-08 (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/ 
documents/courtdoc/Case%20001AppealJudgementEn.pdf (noting that the very act 
of rape brings about suffering that could constitute torture). 
 14.  See infra Part IV. 
 15.  See infra Part III. 
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crime against humanity at the ICC and the majority of tribunals, 
international criminal courts from the 1990s onwards have still 
opted, on many occasions, to prosecute the act of rape as another 
offense: rape as torture, rape as genocide, or rape as sexual slavery.16 
This Article will therefore use the Cambodian experience as a lens 
through which to explore how these approaches to prosecuting rape 
in conflict have led to “unintended consequences” in the treatment of 
rape in international law.17 If transitional justice is to allow all 
people, including women, to move forward after conflict, then it 
must devise a new and more nuanced way to heal the wounds caused 
by rape in conflict.  In order to pave the way for some preliminary 
steps in this direction, it is important to first understand how 
international jurisprudence, particularly that of the ECCC, came to 
reach the current impasse. 
II. CAMBODIA’S LONG WAIT FOR 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: ESTABLISHING THE 
ECCC 
Over thirty years since the fall of the Khmer Rouge, the ECCC is 
only now prosecuting its second case, and may never get any further 
than that.18 Any advancements are certain to be slow, and they must 
contend with the already muted belief in the tribunal’s potential to 
deliver justice and improve public feeling in Cambodia at this point 
 16.  See infra Part IV. 
 17.  See Engle, supra note 6, at 807 (asserting that feminist positions 
reaffirmed by the ICTY created unintended consequences which affect how rape is 
dealt with on an international level, such as the minimization of women’s sexual 
agency). 
 18.  At the time of writing, Case 002/01 was still in (delayed) appellate 
hearings before the Supreme Court Chamber and Case 002/02 was in the early 
stages of trial hearings. With Case 002/02 not expected to have a final appeal 
judgment until 2019, it is a near certainty that Cases 003 and 004 will not be 
finalized by 2019. See Completion Plan - Revision 4, Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia, March 31, 2015, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/ 
files/Completion%20plan%20Rev%204%20Final.pdf [hereinafter Completion 
Plan]; see also OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, THE FUTURE OF CASES 003/004 
AT THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA 33 (2012), 
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/eccc-report-cases3and4-
100112_0.pdf (calling on the ECCC to ensure it does pursue cases 003 and 004, 
reflecting the fears that it may not do so).   
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in time.19 Nevertheless, the declared purpose of the ECCC is to 
deliver justice and to aid national efforts at reconciliation, peace, 
security, and stability.20 The ECCC also aims to bring to light the 
crimes of the Khmer Rouge as a learning moment for Cambodia’s 
younger generations.21 As to why the trials are only now taking 
place, there is no singular answer other than “politics” in the broadest 
sense of the word.22 In the more immediate aftermath of the reign of 
the Khmer Rouge, there was only further conflict, lasting until the 
1990s.23 Even after a peace settlement was reached, which marked 
the end of a subsequent decade of war between Cambodia and 
Vietnam,24 reasons for continued judicial inertia ranged from the 
political near-impossibility of a tribunal organized by the U.N. 
Security Council (as was done for Rwanda), to the inexistence of the 
ICC.25 In short, no agreement could be reached as to the form and 
leadership of a tribunal. Finally, in 1997, when the Cambodian 
 19.  See Kheang Un, The Khmer Rouge Tribunal: A Politically Compromised 
Search for Justice, 72 J. ASIAN STUD. 783, 787 (2013) (suggesting that Cambodian 
politicians have been critical of the tribunal as potentially endangering peace and 
stability and opening old wounds, while the majority of the Cambodian public 
would prefer efforts to be focused on more immediate social and economic 
concerns, such as healthcare, rather than on the Khmer Rouge trials, but also 
noting the rising levels of Cambodians who believe the tribunal will promote 
reconciliation and bring about justice for victims and their families); see also 
Khmer Rouge Trials: Justice of a Kind, ECONOMIST (June 30, 2011), 
http://www.economist.com/node/18898168 (stating that the Cambodian prime 
minister, Hun Sen, does not want the ECCC to continue beyond Case 002, 
ostensibly out of fears for continued reconciliation and peace).  
 20.  See G.A. Res. 57/288/B at 2 (May 22, 2003) (alluding to the agreement 
between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia concerning 
the prosecution under Cambodian law of crimes committed during the period of 
Democratic Kampuchea).  
 21.  See Why are we Having Trials now? How will the Khmer Rouge Trials 
Benefit the People of Cambodia?, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE CTS. OF 
CAMBODIA, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/faq/why-are-we-having-trials-now-how-
will-khmer-rouge-trials-benefit-people-cambodia (last visited Oct. 15, 2015).  
 22.  See Khmer Rouge Trials: Justice of a Kind, supra note 19.  
 23.  See Susan Dicklitch & Aditi Malik, Justice, Human Rights, and 
Reconciliation in Postconflict Cambodia, 11 HUM. RTS. REV. 515, 516-18 (2010) 
(noting that after the United Nations organized elections in 1993, the government 
in Cambodia was plagued by infighting, which ultimately resulted in a coup).  
 24.  U.N. General Assembly, Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, 
U.N. Doc. A/46/608, Annex (Oct. 30, 1991). 
 25.  See TOM FAWTHROP & HELEN JARVIS, GETTING AWAY WITH GENOCIDE? 
ELUSIVE JUSTICE AND THE KHMER ROUGE TRIBUNAL 1, 2 (2004) (explaining the 
history that gave rise to the ICC).  
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Government reached out to the United Nations, there were further 
political roadblocks to be navigated, both for Cambodia internally26 
and in its tumultuous negotiations with the United Nations.27 It was 
only in 2001 that the Laws of the ECCC were established, and it 
would be another six years until the court could be declared fully 
operational.28 Now, after considerable delays, the ECCC is making 
slow progress in prosecuting crimes.29 
The jurisdiction of the ECCC allows it to prosecute senior Khmer 
Rouge leaders and others deemed most responsible for a number of 
the crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge from 1975–1979, 
including crimes against humanity,30 within which rape is explicitly 
listed.31 Yet while rape, as explained below, formed a significant 
body of crimes perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge and is singled out as 
grounds for conviction in ECCC law, it has not been a sufficient 
focus of Cambodia’s transitional justice.32 
III. THE REALITIES OF RAPE UNDER THE KHMER 
ROUGE 
Ruling over Cambodia from 1975–1979, the Khmer Rouge strived 
to reject modernity and enact their vision of an agrarian revolution.33 
This involved the killing of one quarter of the population, who were 
victims of overwork and malnutrition, by execution in the killing 
fields, in detention centers, and in their villages and homes.34 Those 
who survived continued to endure forced movement, forced 
 26.  See generally id. at 134-38 (detailing the developments within Cambodia 
in regard to the possibility of a tribunal in the 1990s and early 2000s). 
 27.  See generally id. at 155-57 (discussing the initial contentions and issues 
between the United Nations and Cambodia).  
 28.  See EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA: ECCC AT 
A GLANCE (2014), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/ECCC%20at%20a% 
20Glance%20-%20EN%20-%20April%202014_FINAL.pdf.   
 29.  See Completion Plan, supra note 18.  
 30.  See Law on the Establishment of the ECCC, supra note 9, at arts. 1-8. 
 31.  See id. at art. 5. 
 32.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 33.  See Joel Brinkley, Cambodia’s Curse: Struggling to Shed the Khmer 
Rouge’s Legacy, 88 FOREIGN AFF. 111, 111 (2009) (describing Pol Pot’s plan to 
bring the country to “year zero”). 
 34.  See id.; see also FAWTHROP & JARVIS, supra note 25, at 3 (describing that 
roughly two million people were killed under the Khmer Rouge’s reign). 
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marriages, starvation, fear, and backbreaking agricultural work.35 
The Khmer Rouge controlled almost every element of life in 
Cambodia and this involved ensuring people’s only loyalty was to 
the regime, to Angkar.36 Part of Khmer Rouge policy included 
breaking family ties and weakening interpersonal affiliations,  
largely through forced labor and forced movement and perhaps most 
strikingly through forced marriages, in which refusal to engage in 
sex, according to numerous accounts, was a punishable offense.37  
Conversely, the formation of any emotional bond within these 
marriages appears to have been actively discouraged.38 Forced 
marriages were systematically implemented39 as part of the regime’s 
move toward being a collectivity, to living in what survivors have 
called a “prison without walls.”40 Sex and marriage were only 
permissible under the strict terms of Khmer Rouge policy.41 As such, 
forced marriage occasioned a large number of the rapes that 
happened during the time of the Khmer Rouge. But, forced marriage 
 35.  See generally Brinkley, supra note 33, at 111; KARL D. JACKSON, 
CAMBODIA 1975-1978: RENDEZVOUS WITH DEATH 3-4 (1989) (overviewing the 
impact of Khmer Rouge rule on the lives of Cambodians and the deleterious effect 
of its draconian policies). 
 36.  See Dicklitch & Malik, supra note 23, at 516-18 (explaining that the 
Khmer Rouge’s quest for the communist utopia resulted in rule by terror whereby 
no one was safe from extermination). 
 37.  See Neha Jain, Forced Marriage as a Crime Against Humanity: Problems 
of Definition and Prosecution, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1013, 1024-25 (2008) (noting 
that by destroying family bonds through forced marriages, the Khmer Rouge 
sought to strengthen loyalty to the party). See also THERESA DE LANGIS ET AL., 
TRANSCULTURAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, LIKE GHOST CHANGES BODY: A 
STUDY ON THE IMPACT OF FORCED MARRIAGE UNDER THE KHMER ROUGE REGIME 
(October 2014), http://kh.boell.org/sites/default/files/forced_marriage_study_ 
report_tpo_october_2014.pdf. 
 38.  Couples report being brought together only for the purpose of procreation, 
and otherwise living apart. See DE LANGIS ET AL., supra note 37, at 28 (“Married 
couples stayed with each other a few days following the wedding, often with 
Khmer Rouge spies, or chhlob, making sure they consummated the marriage with 
sexual relations. Then, the pair went back to their respective workgroups, meeting 
for conjugal visits every seven to ten days—or as long as months apart. The main 
purpose of the marriages was not to form privatized families as in a traditional 
context, but to ‘produce children to serve the revolution’ [footnotes omitted]”).   
 39.  See Case 002, Case File No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ, Closing Order, 
¶¶ 218-20 (Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/ 
courtdoc/D427Eng.pdf.  
 40.  See id. at ¶ 158.  
 41.  See id. at ¶ 217. 
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was certainly not the only context in which rape occurred under the 
regime.42 
The ECCC has found that sexual relationships outside of marriage 
were deemed immoral by the regime, who included in the 
Communisty Party of Kampuchea’s (“CPK”) Party’s Moral Code the 
order “[d]o not take liberties with women,” and Armed Force’s 
Moral Code provided “[w]e must not do anything detrimental to 
women.”43 Failure to conform with the Moral Codes often resulted in 
being labeled an “enemy” or “bad-element,” carrying with it the fate 
of re-education or even death.44 The Moral Code was not, however, 
consistently upheld, nor were transgressions always punished.45 The 
ECCC has even acknowledged that  the policy did not manage to 
stop rape . Nevertheless, the Court ultimately determined that rape, 
classified and sometimes punished as a moral offense, was neither 
ordered nor committed with the express intent of implementing the 
common purpose of the Khmer Rouge.46 In other words, rape was 
not part of the policy, unless it happened within the context of forced 
marriage.47 Given the court’s stated understanding of the demands of 
the modes of liability through which the accused can be held 
responsible, this determination of policy serves as a barrier to 
prosecuting rapes outside of forced marriage. 
However, there is much evidence to suggest that rape and other 
forms of sexual violence were very much part of the Khmer Rouge’s 
systematic and widespread attack on civilians throughout 
 42.  See CAMBODIAN DEFENDERS PROJECT, supra note 1, at 3-4 (listing the 
multitudes of ways that perpetrators used rape against women and girls during the 
Khmer Rouge regime).  
 43.  Case 002, Case File No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ, Closing Order, ¶ 
191.   
 44.  See id. ¶¶ at 1181, 1428-29 (noting that the Co-Investigating Judges 
satisfied themselves that “with regard to morality, the policy of the CPK was that 
perpetrators of rape were to be punished,” yet acknowledged that such punishment 
did not always occur, and many soldiers committed rapes and faced no 
consequences from senior members); see also Jain, supra note 37, at 1025 
(discussing how women that refused to marry men chosen for them were subjected 
to violence and that the fear of violence coerced other women into marriages).   
 45.  See Case 002, Case File No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ, Closing Order, 
¶¶ 1181, 1428-29.   
 46.  See id. at ¶ 1429.   
 47.  See id. at ¶ 1429.   
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Kampuchea,48 regardless of the Moral Codes. The wealth of 
testimony from both direct victims and witnesses evidences the 
ineffectiveness of these official policy prohibitions of rape.49 One 
woman has recounted being the sole survivor from among thirty 
women, raped repeatedly by numerous soldiers in view of one 
another around the mass grave in which women were then interred.50 
Rape occurred not only before execution, but also as torture, as a 
 48.  See id. at ¶¶ 1426-27 (declining to prosecute these rapes on principles of 
legality, the court acknowledges that “it is clearly established that under the 
Democratic Kampuchea regime crimes against humanity of rape were committed 
in diverse circumstances”); see also CAMBODIAN DEFENDERS PROJECT, supra note 
1, at 13-16 (describing the results of the testimonies presented by victims of and 
witnesses to rape and sexual violence under the Khmer Rouge). 
 49.  See CAMBODIAN DEFENDERS PROJECT, supra note 1, at 13; (stating 
perpetrators were rarely accused or convicted of rape); see also ROCHELLE BRAAF, 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST ETHNIC MINORITIES DURING THE KHMER ROUGE 
REGIME (2014) (focusing on rape and sexual violence targeted at ethnic 
minorities); DUONG SAVORN, THE MYSTERY OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE UNDER THE 
KHMER ROUGE 1 (2011) (providing a compilation of survivor and witness accounts 
of rape and sexual violence by Khmer Rouge soldiers); see also, Transcript of 
hearing on the substance in Case 002/02, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia, Jan. 13, 2016 (witness 2-TCW-928 described hearing the cries of 
women who were taken to be raped); KATRINA NATALE, “I COULD FEEL MY SOUL 
FLYING AWAY FROM MY BODY,” A STUDY ON GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE DURING 
DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA IN BATTAMBANG AND SVAY RIENG PROVINCES 1 
(2011) (“Among respondents in this survey, 65.4% were aware of rape perpetrated 
by agents of the Khmer Rouge during Democratic Kampuchea. As well, 28.8% of 
all respondents were direct witnesses to acts of rape. . .[rape scenarios included] 
gang and mass rape, rapes in Khmer Rouge installations and cooperatives, rapes 
with foreign objects, rape through sexual exploitation and sexual slavery, 
attempted rape, rape of men. . .”).  
 50.  See CAMBODIAN DEFENDERS PROJECT, supra note 1, at 8 (citing Net 
Savoen’s personal experience with the atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge). 
Notably, this account was before a non-judicial audience, discrete from the ECCC. 
However, examination of investigate requests evidences that many witnesses and 
victims have mentioned instances of rape when talking with staff from the Office 
of Co-Investigating Judges at the ECCC, only to have various bodies at the ECCC 
gloss over such matters, despite numerous efforts by the Co-Lead Lawyers for 
Civil Parties to have accounts of rape properly investigated. E.g., Co-Lawyers for 
the Civil Parties’ Fourth Investigative Request Concerning Forced Marriages and 
Sexually Related Crimes, Case File/Dossier No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, December 4, 2009, at para. 3 
(“Co-Lawyers for Civil Parties note that Forced Marriages and other sexually 
related crimes have been mentioned propriu moto by a number of witnesses . . . 
But they were never questioned about the circumstances and details of these 
crimes”).  
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means of instilling fear.51 Rapes were often committed by groups of 
soldiers and families were painfully aware of the rape of their loved 
ones—some even bore witness.52 But, the ECCC remains adamant 
that such rapes were not committed in pursuit of the regime’s 
“common purpose,”53 were not  part of the widespread or a 
systematic attack on the civilian population54 and  thus cannot be 
prosecuted as the crime against humanity of other inhumane acts.55 
IV. ECCC LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS 
REGARDING RAPE 
There are two stages to the ECCC’s self-defeat in the prosecution 
of rape. The first stage is the court’s application of the principle of 
legality, from which it determined that to try rape as a distinct crime 
against humanity at the ECCC would be to impute customary 
international norms prohibiting rape onto acts of rape that pre-date 
such norms.56 The court’s application of the principle of legality 
leaves much room for criticism. However, to do this justice would be 
beyond the scope of this Article. Therefore, after briefly 
summarizing the shortcomings of the ECCC’s analysis of the status 
of rape in customary international law at the time of the Khmer 
Rouge, this failing will nevertheless be accepted as the point from 
which further analysis of the ECCC’s treatment of rape must stem. 
The second stage of the ECCC’s stifling of rape prosecutions 
involves an understanding of how the court, left with the possibility 
of prosecuting rape as another inhumane act, came to rule that only 
rapes within forced marriage would qualify for such action.57 
 51.  See id. at 3 (citing the expert testimony of Kasumi Nakagawa, who, in 
2007, was one of the first researchers to conduct a study into gender-based 
violence during the rule of the Khmer Rouge).   
 52.  See id. at 6 (referring to the testimony of Mr. Vana who witnessed the 
gang rape of his sister).   
 53.  Closing Order Case 002, supra note 2, at paras. 1429, 1432.  
 54.  Whereas forced marriages and rapes occurring therein were. Id. at paras. 
156-157, 1428-1432, 1445-1446.  
 55.  See Case 002, Case File No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ, Closing Order, 
¶ 1429.  
 56.  Appeal Judgment (Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch), Case File/Dossier No. 
001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia, Feb. 3, 2012, at para. 213 [hereinafter Case 001 Appeal].  
 57.  See id. at ¶¶ 1429-30.  
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A. MISAPPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY: THE 
INHUMANITY OF RAPE UNDER THE KHMER ROUGE 
Article 5 of the ECCC Statute provides for the prosecution of 
crimes against humanity. Within crimes against humanity, a number 
of distinct offenses are enumerated, including torture and rape, in 
addition to the residual offense of “other inhumane acts.”58 However,  
being enumerated as a discrete crime against humanity under article 
5 does not by itself mean that a prosecution can be brought for the 
offense of rape as a crime against humanity as it currently stands in 
international law—article 5 merely sets out a priori jurisdiction. All 
prosecutions brought by the ECCC must be in accordance with the 
principle of legality,59 meaning that prosecuted offenses must have 
constituted a criminal offense under international or Cambodian law 
at the time they were allegedly committed.60 Thus, in reviewing the 
Trial Chamber’s conviction of rape as the crime against humanity of 
torture, the Supreme Chamber sought to ostensibly assess of the 
status of rape as a distinct crime against humanity from 1975–1979.61 
This was particularly pertinent because the Trial Chamber, although 
opting to convict the act of rape as the crime against humanity of 
torture, held that the act of rape could have been prosecuted as the 
crime against humanity of rape qua rape,62 but subsumed it within 
torture because the additional elements of torture were satisfied.63 
 58.  Law on the Establishment of the ECCC, supra note 9, at art. 5.  
 59.  See id. at art. 33 (setting out obligations under the principle of legality 
under articles 14 and 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights).  
 60.  See Case 001, Case File No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC, Appeal 
Judgement, ¶¶ 91, 96 (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/ 
documents/courtdoc/Case%20001AppealJudgementEn.pdf (granting great weight 
to the application of the principle of legality in delivering its Appeal Judgment in 
Case 001, incorporating an additional burden to the prosecution that the crime’s 
illegality must have been sufficiently accessible and foreseeable to the accused 
“without reference to any specific provision [of law]”).   
 61.  See Case 002, Case File No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ, Closing Order, 
¶¶ 1426-29 (noting that because the official policy was to punish rape, its 
execution outside the context of marriage did not constitute a crime against 
humanity standing alone).  
 62.  See Law on the Establishment of the ECCC, supra note 9, at art. 5.  
 63.  See Case 001, Case File No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC, Appeal 
Judgement, ¶171; see also Case 001, Case File No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, 
Judgement, ¶¶ 361-62, 366 (July 26, 2010), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/ 
files/documents/courtdoc/20100726_Judgement_Case_001_ENG_PUBLIC.pdf 
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On appeal, the Co-Prosecutors contested that the Trial Chamber 
should have cumulatively charged both rape and as distinct crimes 
against humanity, on the basis that failing to bring a rape-specific 
charge was a failure to “reflec[t] in full the gravity of the conduct.”64 
But, the Supreme Chamber never reached the question of cumulative 
charging, and the hierarchy of harms therein, instead finding that 
rape, as a distinct crime against humanity, was never even a possible 
conviction.65 Taking it upon itself to explore the legality of rape as a 
crime against humanity during the Court’s temporal jurisdiction, the 
Supreme Chamber declared that prohibition of rape as a crime 
against humanity simply was not a legal reality in the 1970s. 
Therefore, the Trial Chamber erred in holding that rape in and of 
itself was a prosecutable offense and thus further erred in subsuming 
it under the conviction for torture as a crime against humanity.66 The 
Supreme Chamber found that while rape had, albeit not always in 
such express terms, been a prohibited war crime since 1863,67 it had 
“not yet crystalised [sic]”68 as a crime against humanity by 1975. 
The Co-Prosecutors had relied upon the jurisprudence of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) as 
evidence of rape as a crime against humanity, and the Supreme 
Chamber believed this to be an inherently flawed approach.69 First 
and foremost, the convictions and criminal acts of these tribunals 
came after the temporal jurisdiction of the ECCC, thus applying 
them to the ECCC cases would, the Supreme Chamber held, violate 
(“Rape has long been prohibited in customary international law,” but, 
“consider[ed] this instance of rape to have comprised . . . an egregious component 
of the prolonged and brutal torture inflicted upon the victim prior to her execution 
and has characterized this conduct accordingly [as rape].”). 
 64.  Case 001, Case File No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC, Appeal Judgement, ¶ 
168 (noting that the Co-Prosecutors believed that rape is in some way distinct from 
torture, even where it meets all of the elements of the crime of torture). 
 65.  See id. at ¶ 174. 
 66.  Id. at ¶ 213. 
 67.  See id. at ¶ 175 (referring to “General Order No. 100” issued by Abraham 
Lincoln). See generally Askin, supra note 4, at 299-300 (criticizing the Lieber 
Code and other early prohibitions of rape and their problematic terminology). 
 68.  Case 001 Appeal, supra note 56, at ¶ 213. 
 69.  Case 001, Case File No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC, Appeal Judgement, 
¶¶ 177-79. 
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the principle of legality.70 Secondly, the decisions of the ad hoc 
tribunals are not binding, so even without the bar of legality, the 
tribunal jurisprudence would still need to be assessed as a 
representation of customary international law and general 
principles.71 To this end, the Supreme Chamber noted the tribunal 
judgments relied upon by the Co-Prosecutors offered no support for 
the idea of rape being a crime against humanity in the 1970s, 
[t]o the contrary, the jurisprudence . . . indicates that by the era of the ad 
hoc tribunals, rape as a crime against humanity remained a nascent notion 
[which] did not begin to take shape until the 1990s, following reports of 
rape being used as a tool in carrying out widespread or systematic attacks 
on civilian populations in Haiti, Bosnia, and Rwanda.72 
The Trial Chamber was therefore held to have erred in concluding 
that rape was prohibited as a crime against humanity under 
customary international law during the temporal jurisdiction of the 
ECCC.73 
It is troubling that while the ICTY could identify rape as a crime 
against humanity as existent by the start of the atrocities in Bosnia, 
the ECCC determined that it could not declare such customary law to 
have been in existence less than twenty years earlier.74 The ECCC, in 
 70.  Id.  
 71.  Id. at ¶ 179. 
 72.  Id.  
 73.  Id. at ¶ 183.   
 74.  Detailed arguments as to why rape can and should be considered to have 
been established as a crime against humanity by the time of the ECCC’s temporal 
jurisdiction can be found in the submissions of the Co-Prosecutors and Civil Party 
Co-Lead Lawyers in Case 002. While these submissions come in response to the 
Closing Order of Case 002 and thus could not change the Appeal Judgment of 
Case 001, they do set out the findings of the existence of rape as a crime against 
humanity that the Supreme Court Chamber should have been able to recognize in 
Case 001, had it done its own legal analysis, rather than simply relying on the work 
of tribunals from the 1990s, that were never tasked with prosecuting rapes 
occurring in the 1970s. See Co-Prosecutors’ Request for the Trial Chamber to 
Recharacterize the Facts Establishing the Conduct of Rape as the Crime Against 
Humanity of Rape Rather than the Crime Against Humanity of Other Inhumane 
Acts, Case File No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC, Doc. E99, (Extraordinary 
Chambers Cts. Cambodia, June 16, 2011); Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyers Response 
to the Co-Prosecutors Request to Recharacterize the Facts Establishing the 
Conduct of Rape as a Crime Against Humanity, Case File No. 002/19-09-2007-
ECCC/TC, Doc. E99/1, (Extraordinary Chambers Cts. Cambodia, July 21, 2011). 
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its determination of rape’s absence from customary international law 
in the period of 1975–1979, does not allude to when rape as a crime 
against humanity emerged between the Khmer Rouge and the 
temporal jurisdiction of the ICTY, which began in 1991.75 Rather, 
the ECCC seems to accept that the criminality of rape somehow 
emerged within customary international law in tandem with its 
increasingly visible use as a tool of war, leaving the ECCC chasing 
its tail in its own justifications. Worryingly, the Supreme Court 
Chamber appears to have found the acceptance of rape’s 
establishment as a crime against humanity in the 1990s at the ICTY 
to somehow preclude its existence as such prior to that date.76 Even 
more worrying is the implication that had there been 
contemporaneous public outcry about sexual crimes committed by 
the Khmer Rouge, the ECCC may have been willing to find that rape 
was already crystalizing into a crime against humanity at that time.77 
Yet, as sexual crimes have a tendency to be less publicly discussed – 
and as this silence was compounded by the totalitarian nature of the 
Khmer Rouge and the global failure to expose the atrocities faced by 
Cambodian civilians under the regime – silence about rape in the 
1970s is used by the ECCC to beget more deafening silence about 
rape in present day efforts for justice. The best thing to be said about 
the ECCC’s deployment of the principle of legality is that it is lazy; 
the more concerning critique is that it is negligent and a particularly 
disappointing example of the gendered nature of international law, 
specifically that of jus cogens norms.78 
B. “COMMON PURPOSE”: DISTINGUISHING RAPE IN FORCED 
MARRIAGE FROM ALL OTHER RAPES 
This leads to the second strand of ECCC jurisprudence, which 
ultimately signaled a dead-end for the prosecution of a vast majority 
 75.  ICTY Statute, supra note 9, at arts. 5, 8. 
 76.  Case 001 Appeal, supra note 56, at ¶ 178.  
 77.  Id. (“In fact, recognition of rape as a crime against humanity did not begin 
to take shape until the 1990s, following reports of rape being used a tool in 
carrying out widespread or systematic attacks on civilian populations in Haiti, 
Bosnia, and Rwanda.” This suggests that the news reports and recognition thereof 
played a significant role in establishing rapes as being crimes against humanity 
(provided they possessed the requisite chapeau elements) in the 1990s).  
 78.  Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, The Gender of Jus Cogens, 15 
HUM. RTS. Q. 63, 65 (1993) (explaining the gendered nature of international law).  
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of rapes within the court’s jurisdiction. Having ruled on Appeal in 
Case 001 that rapes could not be prosecuted as rape per se, due to the 
principle of legality, the ECCC in Case 002/02 nevertheless retains 
the possibility of prosecuting acts of rape, albeit as different crimes 
against humanity than that of rape, such as other inhumane acts.79 
The Court, however, has greatly limited the number and types of acts 
of rape it can prosecute as other crimes against humanity. 
All of the crimes listed within crimes against humanity must meet 
the chapeau requirements of being carried out as part of a widespread 
or systematic attack directed against a civilian population on 
national, political, ethnical, racial, or religious grounds.80 
Additionally, responsibility for commission of the crimes must lay 
with the accused, most notably through joint criminal enterprise – 
although other modes of responsibility are possible.81 And it is here 
that the court determines that rape outside of forced marriage falls 
short of the legal elements necessary for prosecution in International 
Criminal Law.82 
The juxtaposition of the treatment of rape within forced marriage 
as a crime against humanity and all other rape as simply something 
 79.  The Office of the Co-Investigating Judges in producing the Closing Order 
for Case 002 does not, however, appear to have read the Appeal Judgment of Case 
001, as the Co-Investigating Judges state that “the legal elements of the crime 
against humanity of rape have been established in the context of forced marriage,” 
with no reference to the preclusion of rape as a crime against humanity at the 
ECCC due to the principal of legality, which is quite clearly stated at para. 213 of 
the Appeal Judgment of Case 001. However, by noting that “[t]he facts 
characterized as crimes against humanity in the form of rape can additionally be 
characterized as crimes against humanity in the form of sexual violence,” the Co-
Investigating Judges may be showing some sense that a rape charge may face 
difficulties, hence their provision of an alternate legal characterization.  See Case 
001 Appeal, supra note 56, at ¶ 178; Closing Order Case 002, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 
1430-1433. 
 80.  See Law on the Establishment of the ECCC, supra note 9, art. 5.  
 81.  Closing Order Case 002, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 156-158, 1318, 1524-25, 
1543-62 (Most notably, para. 1318 of the Closing Order states that ECCC law 
“provides that any suspect who committed (including by way of a joint criminal 
enterprise: JCE I or II); ordered; instigated; planned; or aided and abetted any of 
the crimes provided for in the ECCC Law shall be individually responsible for the 
crime.”). 
 82.  Case 002, Case File No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ, Closing Order, ¶¶ 
1428-30 (Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/ 
courtdoc/D427Eng.pdf.  
 
2015 HRA ARTICLES ONLINE VERSION (PRINT VERSION FORTHCOMING VOL. 32.2)  
2017] RAPE BY ANY OTHER NAME 517 
that unfortunately happened is most starkly rendered in just a few 
paragraphs of the Closing Order for Case 002.83 Conceding that rape 
occurred outside forced marriages, and that the official policy 
prohibition of sex outside marriage did not in fact prevent such rapes, 
the court nevertheless concluded that, “it cannot be considered that 
rape was one of the crimes used by the [Communist Party of 
Kampuchea, or] CPK leaders to implement the common purpose.”84 
Then, within just a few lines, the court held that the acts of rape 
within forced marriage were part of an attack on the civilian 
population, one that the perpetrators were aware of, and one that 
attacked civilians particularly by “targeting . . . the physical and 
physiological integrity of the victim.”85 The implication is that those 
soldiers who raped civilians outside of forced marriages, and the 
leaders who allowed them to do so with impunity, did so not as an 
attack on the civilian population, but merely as something they just 
did. More worrying still is the implication that while all rape in 
forced marriage, “by its nature or consequences,”86 was a targeted 
physical and psychological attack, all other rape was therefore not 
intended as, nor experienced as, a physical or psychological attack. 
But as the overwhelming testimony from the Women’s Hearing,87 
and the accounts put forth by the civil party lawyers, attest, rape 
outside forced marriage, “rapes . . . akin [to] torture, ill-treatment and 
killing,” were not only committed by members of the Khmer Rouge, 
they were widespread and unpunished.88 Furthermore, victims attest 
to experiencing the rapes as a physical and psychological attack.89 
Yet, this testimony has been excluded from proceedings at the 
ECCC, both by the ECCC’s questionable application of the principle 
of legality and its arbitrary determination of which rapes do or do not 
 83.  Id.  
 84.  Id. at ¶ 1429.  
 85.  Id. at ¶ 1431. 
 86.  See id.  
 87.  See generally CAMBODIAN DEFENDERS PROJECT, supra note 1, at 6-10 
(relating the stories of the testifiers at the Women’s Hearing). 
 88.  See Silke Studzinsky, Speech at the International Conference on 
Bangladesh Genocide and the Issue of Justice (July 4–5, 2013), 
http://www.civilparties.org/?p=1620, at 1, 5 (relating the experience of a civil party 
lawyer). 
 89.  See id. at 6 (recognizing the courage it took for the victims to speak out); 
see also CAMBODIAN DEFENDERS PROJECT, supra note 1, at 4 (noting how 
survivors still suffer physically and mentally). 
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satisfy the requirements of the applicable modes of responsibility.90 
In the Closing Order for Case 002, the Office of the Co-
Investigating Judges set out the mens rea requirement of joint 
criminal enterprise as “a shared intent to contribute to or participate 
in the implementation of a common purpose.”91 It is relatively 
uncontroversial that to be held responsible under joint criminal 
enterprise – the predominant mode of responsibility considered in 
Case 002 – the accused must have shared an intent to contribute or 
participate in the implementation of a common purpose, and that 
liability will be limited to crimes carried out in pursuit of said 
purpose. The controversy arises in regards to the ECCC’s 
determination of just what is and is not part of the “common 
purpose,” and thus of what crimes may be prosecuted under this 
mode of responsibility, and those that will be excluded. The Office 
of the Co-Investigating Judges decided that forced marriage, or 
“regulation of marriage,” as it is described in the Closing Order, was 
one of five policies through which the accused attempted to achieve 
the common purpose. From this point, the Co-Investigating Judges 
determine that crimes  commissioned in pursuit of this common 
purpose may be charged, as the mode of liability is thus established, 
but crimes that happened not in pursuit of the common purpose must 
be excluded from the charges, as they cannot be brought into this 
chain of responsibility.92 Because rape outside of forced marriage 
was not committed in pursuit of the common purpose – that is to say, 
not in pursuit of one of the five policies identified by the Co-
Investigating Judges93 - the ECCC holds that charges related to such 
rapes cannot come in under Joint Criminal Enterprise. Under Joint 
Criminal Enterprise, the accused can be held responsible only for the 
crimes committed in pursuit of the common purpose, not crimes that 
 90.  See Case 001, Case File No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Judgement, ¶¶ 
26-34 (July 26, 2010), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/ 
courtdoc/20100726_Judgement_Case_001_ENG_PUBLIC.pdf (explaining each of 
the charged crimes and forms of responsibility must conform to the principle of 
legality and relating that the ECCC was established and conferred with jurisdiction 
over offenses after they were allegedly committed).  
 91.  Closing Order Case 002 supra note 2, at ¶ 1521.  
 92.  Id. at ¶¶ 1524-42. 
 93.  Id. at ¶ 157 (policies of: forced movement; worksites and cooperatives; re-
education of “bad elements” and killing of “enemies”; targeting of specific groups; 
regulation of marriage).  
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were carried out for some other purpose, e.g., rapes that could not be 
said to further one of the five policies.  Under Superior 
Responsibility, however, there should be potential for prosecuting 
rapes that happened outside of forced marriage. Superior 
Responsibility “results from the breach of the duty to prevent the 
commission of, or punish participants of, the commission of a 
crime.”94 And thus, crimes charged under Superior Responsibility 
would not need to have been carried out as part of the common 
purpose, because the accused did not have to intend for such crimes 
to be carried out.95 Rather, the superior would simply need to have 
known, or had reason to know, that subordinates were carrying out 
rapes while under his or her effective control, and have failed to 
prevent or punish such crimes.96 While superiors punished some acts 
of rape, it is clear that many acts of rape were not punished – yet the 
Court fails to explain why it will not prosecute such crimes under the 
mode of Superior Responsibility. 
It is disappointing that the Closing Order does not bring in charges 
for rapes outside of forced marriage under Superior Responsibility, 
instead continuing to specify that it refers to rapes only in the context 
of forced marriage.97 It is even more disappointing that it provides no 
explanation as to why it continues to restrict itself to crimes 
 94.  Id. at ¶¶ 1557 (notably, this is a form of indirect responsibility, thus it is 
only available where more direct modes of responsibility are not found: 
“Consequently, the Charged Persons cannot be sent for trial on the basis of this 
form of (indirect) responsibility and also on the basis of direct responsibility (such 
as to commit, plan, incite, aid and abet, or order).”). In the face of challenges from 
the defense, who argued that Superior Responsibility was precluded as a mode of 
responsibility at the ECCC by the principle of legality, the Pre-Trial Chamber held 
that Senior Responsibility was in fact an established mode of responsibility during 
the Court’s temporal jurisdiction, and thus prosecutions could be brought against 
the accused under this mode. However, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s reasoning for this 
decision has been criticized, even while the overall decision has been supported. 
See generally Rehan Abeyratne, Superior Responsibility and the Principle of 
Legality at the ECCC, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 39 (2012).  
 95.  ECCC Law, supra note 11, at art. 29.  
 96.  For analysis of what Superior Responsibility does require, see Abeyratne, 
supra note 94, at 57 (Superior Responsibility requires the existence of a “superior-
subordinate” relationship characterized by “effective control,” wherein the superior 
“knew or had reason to know” that his subordinates had committed or were 
committing crimes, and the superior failed to take “necessary and reasonable 
measures” to prevent or punish the perpetrators of such crimes.) 
 97.  Id. at ¶ 1559.  
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committed in pursuit of the common purpose, i.e., for the purposes of 
regulating marriage. This is particularly frustrating given that there 
should be no need for crimes charged under Superior Responsibility 
to fit within the five policies identified as being part of the common 
purpose. Ultimately, however, the ECCC’s focus on the common 
purpose requirements of the direct modes of responsibility, and its 
apparent extension of this the indirect mode of Superior 
Responsibility, sees a great number of acts of rape excluded from 
prosecution because they, in the view of the Office of Co-
Investigating Judges, served no higher purpose. Rape without loftier 
goals, rape against the rules, rape knowingly left unpunished, is thus 
knowingly excluded at the ECCC. 
C. ASSESSING THE PROSECUTION OF RAPE AT THE ECCC 
The ECCC’s construction & zealous application of “common 
purpose” as requiring the express support of an act by Khmer Rouge 
official policy renders the court’s approach troubling. It is even more 
disturbing that the court then quietly extended this “common 
purpose” requirement to Superior Responsibility. In its assessment of 
the development of rape as a crime against humanity in Case 001, the 
court acknowledged that the ostensible lack of visibility of rape prior 
to the 1990s stymied its crystallization as such.98 Yet here, in Case 
002, it is the ECCC itself that is obscuring rape, even from the 
recorded history of the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge. The ECCC 
has not only declined to avail itself of international law’s 
condemnation of rape as a crime against humanity, but is in fact 
refusing to contribute, instead reverting to the longstanding tradition 
of international law denying public redress of violations of women’s 
rights.99 From this standpoint, the jurisprudence of the ECCC 
illustrates that the tribunals of the 1990s, and the feminist academics 
that influenced them, undoubtedly made progress in the prosecuting 
of rape in conflict. But this progress has not been wholly satisfactory, 
as will be explored. 
 98.  See Case 001, Case File No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Judgement, ¶ 364 
(indicating that the social stigma attached to rape victims might render any proof 
of rape difficult).  
 99.  See Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 78, at 68-69 (asserting the gender 
bias in international human rights law). 
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V. HOW DID WE GET BACK HERE FROM THERE: 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RESPONSES TO RAPE 
IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE FROM WWII TO 
BOSNIA, RWANDA, AND BEYOND 
Looking back over these arguments as to the prosecution of rape 
helps to map the terrain of prosecuting rape in conflict. Doing so, 
cognizant of the failings of the ECCC, throws into sharp relief how 
the systematic nature of rape is recognized only when rape is 
explicitly linked to a larger plan of attack. Doris E. Buss recalls how 
feminists made a concerted effort to bring prosecution of rape to the 
fore at the ICTY and ICTR, and then to build on this progress by 
setting out not only rape but also other forms of sexual violence as 
prohibited acts in the statute of the ICC.100 Buss raises a number of 
pressing concerns with these developments, but most relevant here is 
her contention that the specific contexts of Bosnia and Rwanda and 
the prosecutions that follow may result in only a limited “visibility” 
of the sexual violence suffered by women.101 Arguably, the tribunals 
have failed “in making visible, and treating as relevant, violence 
against women as a systemic gender issue in and of itself.”102 
Yet, for all the valid fears that systematic rape of women may only 
be seen when it relates to genocide, to the community, or to 
something involving men, there is an equal fear that feminist efforts 
to elevate the status of rape in wartime to something that transcends 
all other crimes risks elevating the “badness” of rape. Considering 
rape as the worst possible crime may risk increasing the potency and 
efficacy of rape as a weapon, and  might even essentialize women as 
their experiences of rape.103 There is a difficult conceptual 
reconciliation to be made between rape and other crimes: crimes that 
 100.  Doris E. Buss, The Curious Visibility of Wartime Rape: Gender and 
Ethnicity in International Criminal Law, 25 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 3, 12 
(2007) (citing Rhonda Copelon, Integrating Crimes Against Women into 
International Criminal Law, 46 MCGILL L.J. 217, 234 (2000) (advocating for 
“integration” of “gender justice” within the new ICC)).  
 101.  See id. at 21-22 (noting the visibility of the patriarchy in the proceedings). 
 102.  See id. at 12 (indicating that the results of the tribunal decisions are 
troubling).   
 103.  See Janet Halley, Rape in Berlin: Reconsidering the Criminalisation of 
Rape in the International Law of Armed Conflict, 9 MELB. J. INT’L L. 78, 80, 83-86 
(2008) (implying that intensifying the criminality of rape in war may produce less 
rape or less violence, or even fewer crimes).  
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could subsume a charge of rape, crimes that may require rape plus 
additional elements, and instances of rape that may satisfy only the 
elements of the crime of rape and nothing more.104 
At the ICTY, prosecution of rape ran the gamut of such varied 
conceptualizations and categorizations.105 The ICTY statute 
recognized rape as a distinct crime against humanity106—perhaps its 
most important gain when compared to the ECCC—and indeed 
prosecuted it as such.107 It also charged rape as a violation of 
customary international law.108 Notably, the tribunal prosecuted 
certain instances of rape as both rape and torture,109 as well as setting 
the precedent of sexual violence fulfilling the elements of 
enslavement.110 Exactly what ‘rape’ is and is not in the eyes of 
international law is far from settled, and in exploring this 
multifaceted yet somewhat flat legal construction of rape, we can see 
how it has left many gaps in the prosecution of rapes committed 
during conflict. 
 104.  Mark Ellis, Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime, 38 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 225, 247 (2006–2007) (“Prosecuting rape as a subset of 
another crime may, in fact, seem to make the crime of rape less distinctive. 
However, including it as a subset of crimes against humanity, genocide, or war 
crimes draws attention to the heinous nature of the crime.”).  
 105.  See generally Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 
179, 228, 261, 448 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001) 
(citing several examples where rape has been prosecuted in various 
categorizations); Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 
1, 86, 149 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000) (citing 
several examples where rape has been prosecuted in various categorizations).   
 106.  ICTY Statute, supra note 9, art. 5.  
 107.  Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgement, ¶ 
295 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002) (finding instances 
of rape as constituting a crime against humanity); Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-
17/1-A, Judgement, 79 (affirming the conviction of torture as a violation of the 
laws or customs of war and for aiding and abetting outrages upon personal dignity, 
including rape, as a violation of the laws or customs of war). 
 108.  See Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgement, ¶ 210 (holding that 
rape was also a breach of customary international law as it applies to war, while 
the ICTY Statute only lists rape as a crime against humanity).  
 109.  See Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 488, 500 (stating that the 
rapes constituted the offense of torture). 
 110.  See Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgement, ¶ 122 
(holding that the required mens rea of enslavement consists of the intentional 
exercise of a power attaching to the right of ownership, and it is not a requirement 
to prove that the accused intended to detain the victims under constant control for a 
prolonged period of time in order to use them for sexual acts).  
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A. WHEN IS RAPE IN CONFLICT RAPE? 
1. Rape as Torture 
At the ECCC, torture, unlike rape, was found to be a distinct crime 
against humanity under customary international law by 1975.111 But, 
the ECCC understands torture in a much more limited way than the 
ICTY and thus is unable to prosecute as torture many acts of rape 
that the ICTY would easily identify as such.112 Finding that the 
instance of rape in Case 001113 involved government participation 
and had as its purpose a nexus to extracting confessions or inflicting 
punishment,114 the Supreme Chamber upheld the prosecution of the 
act of rape as torture, but overturned the subsuming of the distinct 
crime of rape within that conviction.115 At the ECCC, rape may not 
be subsumed by,116 but may be the actus reus of torture117 when the 
other elements of torture as defined in customary international law of 
1975 are present. Problematically, the ECCC’s reading of the crime 
against humanity of torture as it existed in 1975 means that torture at 
the ECCC has a less expansive definition than it enjoys today under 
the Convention Against Torture.118 The result is that opportunities for 
 111.  Case 001, Case File No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Judgement, ¶ 353 
(July 26, 2010), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/ 
20100726_Judgement_Case_001_ENG_PUBLIC.pdf. 
 112.  See id. ¶ 357 (inferring that the ICTY has a broader definition of torture as 
it did not require the involvement of a state official whereas the ECCC did require 
the involvement of a state official).  
 113.  Id. 
 114.  See id. at ¶ 240.  
 115.  See id. at ¶ 366 (concluding that rape constituted an element of rape).   
 116.  Because rape has been held not to have been a crime against humanity in 
and of itself during the ECCC’s temporal jurisdiction, there is no possibility for it 
to be subsumed within another crime against humanity. For that to happen, rape 
would need to have been an existent crime against humanity, and the Supreme 
Court Chamber in Case 001 explicitly ruled that it was not. Case 001 Appeal, 
supra note 56, at para. 213 (“The Supreme Court Chamber finds that the Trial 
Chamber erred in holding that rape was a distinct crime against humanity under 
customary international law from 1975-1979. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber 
erred in subsuming rape as a distinct crime against humanity under the crime 
against humanity of torture.”).  
 117.  Id. at ¶¶ 354-56, 366 (upholding that the act of rape by its very nature 
constitutes the actus reus of rape).  
 118.  Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113 (stating that 
torture can be for the purpose of “intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or 
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prosecuting rape as torture at the ECCC are in effect restricted to 
situations in which rape was used as a means to inflict “severe 
physical or mental pain or suffering . . . for the specific purpose of 
either obtaining information from the prisoners (principally 
concerning military intelligence matters) or for extracting 
confessions (principally for the purpose of public propaganda).”119 
But before rushing to heap praise on the strides made in prosecuting 
rape as torture at the ICTY, the downsides of doing so should also be 
explored. Not everything that would have resulted in more 
prosecutions of rape at the ECCC would necessarily be understood 
by academics as a success for rape prosecutions in the grander 
scheme of things. 
Before addressing the criticisms of prosecuting rape as torture, it is 
helpful to set out the advantages of such prosecutions and why they 
gained much support in the developing criminalization of wartime 
rape. Conceptions of rape as distinct from torture, just like those seen 
in the ECCC case law above, have given rise to calls from feminist 
academics to prosecute rape as torture, even, perhaps especially, 
where it falls outside more conservative ideas of what acts, and 
particularly which victims, constitute an act of torture.120 Hannah 
Pearce contends that prosecuting rape as torture, and more 
fundamentally understanding the act of rape as inherently an act of 
torture, not merely torture by virtue of a legal re-categorization, will 
allow for rape, and the prohibition and punishment thereof, to be 
taken seriously121—to be treated as seriously as the arguably more 
for any reason based on discrimination of any kind” as well as the more traditional 
conceptions of torture as being for the purpose of “obtaining from him or a third 
person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person 
has committed or is suspected of having committed,” with the former going 
beyond that covered by customary international law during the temporal 
jurisdiction of the ECCC).  
 119.  Case 002, Case File No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ, Closing Order, ¶¶ 
1408-14 (Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/ 
courtdoc/D427Eng.pdf; see also Case 001, Case File No. 001/18-07-
2007/ECCC/TC, Judgement, ¶¶ 289, 353, 356 (repeatedly stressing that torture, in 
compliance with the principle of legality and thus the definition of torture held to 
be in effect in 1975, is for the purpose obtaining information or a confession).  
 120.  See Hannah Pearce, An Examination of the International Understanding of 
Political Rape and the Significance of Labeling it Torture, 14 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 
534, 546 (2002) (indicating that forcible sexual acts can be elements of torture).  
 121.  See id. at 559-60 (suggesting that rape is used as a form of torture and 
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dominant conception of torture as something typically as inflicted 
upon a male political prisoner of conscience.122 Pearce’s approach to 
the continued failure to prosecute rape is to build upon and realize in 
practice the burgeoning, yet constrained, prosecution of torture 
constituted by the rape of women.123 This can be characterized as an 
assimilationist approach in which crimes largely characterized as 
specifically carried out against women, such as rape, can receive 
sufficient attention from the international legal regime by being 
elevated to the level of a crime already widely condemned in practice 
due to its predominant association with the suffering of men. Pearce 
molds her argument for the prosecution of rape as torture, cognizant 
of critiques that to do so could be seen as a trivialization of torture.124 
But, for many feminists, the continual fear in the prosecution of rape 
has been that prosecuting rape as anything other than rape qua rape 
could result in a trivializing of rape, or at least a failure to view rape 
as a distinct crime against humanity, a particular wrong recognized 
as such in and of itself.125 To prosecute rape as anything other than 
rape results, for some, in sending a message that rape alone is not 
advocating for change at the procedural level).  
 122.  Id. at 537, 558 (“Despite the fact that the most significant bodies have 
stated that rape is torture, it is still maintained by some authorities that the 
experience of watching a mother or sister raped would constitute more of a bona 
fide form of torture than the rape itself.”). 
 123.  See Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgement, 1 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000) (holding the conviction of 
torture “as a violation of the laws or customs of war and for aiding and abetting 
outrages upon personal dignity, including rape, as a violation of the laws or 
customs of war”); see also Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-
23/1-A, Judgement, ¶ 180 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 
2002) (finding that aspects of rape overlap with aspects of torture); Prosecutor v. 
Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgement, ¶ 488 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001) (considering the first prosecution of an act of rape as 
the crime of torture as a violation of the laws or customs of war); Christine 
Strumpen-Darrie, Article, Rape: A Survey of Current International Jurisprudence, 
7 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 12, 14-17 (2000) (furthering extrapolation of the ICTY’s 
development of rape as torture). 
 124.  See Pearce, supra note 120, at 540 (rebutting this notion and offering 
evidence that rape causes as much trauma as torture).   
 125.  See Rhonda Copelon, Surfacing Gender: Re-Engraving Crimes Against 
Women in Humanitarian Law, HASTINGS WOMEN’S L. J., 243, 263 [hereinafter 
Copelon, Surfacing Gender] (proposing that sexual violence against women must 
be its own crime against humanity). 
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necessarily bad, that rape per se does not harm.126 While Pearce’s 
project is also a fundamentally feminist one,127 her assimilationist 
approach runs counter to the calls of Copelon, who focuses on the 
need to “surface gender,” to make the gendered nature of rape 
explicit,128 rather than to subsume it within a crime not normally 
associated with women as a type of pragmatic sacrifice. 
The advantage of prosecuting rape as torture, however, is that it 
effectively side-steps the danger that comes with making the 
gendered nature of rape explicit, which is that doing so often results 
in a sexualization of the crime. Pearce explains rape as a “pseudo-
sexual act, a pattern of sexual behavior that is concerned much more 
with status, aggression, control and dominance than with sensual 
pleasure or sexual satisfaction.”129 The connotations of torture allow 
for an envisioning of rape as an act carried out purely for its ability to 
inflict pain or suffering, enabled by an unequal power dynamic that 
need not be stereotypically male/female, and need not involve any 
act of a sexual nature.130 As such, the “pseudo-sexual” nature of rape 
can be better understood when seen as torture: the sexual act is 
merely a means to an end, available due to the inequality at play. The 
end game is suffering and the use of a sexual act to obtain that end 
does not render the experience primarily a sexual one—it remains 
foremost an act of torture. 
This very advantage of prosecuting rape as torture, however, 
further engenders the notion of a hierarchy of harms in which torture 
is sufficiently high enough to be taken seriously, while rape 
languishes lower down. The solution to this, which Pearce seems to 
 126.  See Engle, supra note 6, at 782 (noting other commentators who believe 
that the ICTY and the ICTR have not done enough to make rape in armed conflict 
a war crime).  
 127.  See Pearce, supra note 120, at 559 (focusing on addressing the patriarchal 
denial of women’s experiences of sexual violence and rape being torture: “[i]t is 
indicative of the status of women that sexual violence against women has not yet 
become established as a principle of jus cogens despite the other developments in 
legal attitudes towards rape which have evolved dramatically in the last fifty 
years”). 
 128.  See Copelon, Surfacing Gender, supra note 125, at 264 (claiming the 
gender dimension of rape in war is critical).  
 129.  Pearce, supra note 120, at 540. 
 130.  See id. at 540 (asserting that a rapist is not always motivated by sexual 
reasons but can be motivated by power or anger). 
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venture, is to consider all rape de facto torture.131 The ECCC and 
ICTY approach of requiring the distinct material elements of torture 
to be present in order to elevate the actus reus of rape into the 
prosecution torture would disappear. But, in so doing one would 
invariably have to succumb to an affirming of torture as being the 
worse crime, of being the common denominator of harm, and of rape 
as being merely elemental. This is particularly problematic given that 
rape would continue to exist as a criminal offense in domestic law, 
whilst disappearing from the international law stage—remaining 
only as an actus reus of other offenses, such as torture.132 As such, 
the argument that all rape should be prosecuted is jeopardized—the 
focus on prosecuting rape in conflict risks losing sight of the harm in 
“everyday rape.”133 
2. Rape as Genocide 
In consideration of fears of rape being lost within a hierarchy of 
harms, and the fear that rape might only be prosecuted when it is of a 
particularly heinous nature, the relationship between rape and 
genocide looms large on the horizon. Of the feminist legal theorists 
concerned with the gendered nature of rape inflicted on women, 
Catharine MacKinnon’s voice carried further than many.134 
MacKinnon viewed the rape of Muslim and Croatian women in the 
Former Yugoslavia as genocide, while also characterizing rape of 
women by men as a part of daily life outside of genocide: in the 
Bosnian context, MacKinnon cast rape as existing both in its 
everyday form and as genocide.135 She was exasperated by what she 
perceived as the West’s inability to view rape as consisting of many 
 131.  See id. at 559 (writing of the benefits of a “strong consensus of rape as 
torture”).  
 132.  See Copelon, Surfacing Gender, supra note 125, at 263 (asserting that it is 
not enough for rape to be a vehicle of some other form of persecution when gender 
is usually intertwined).  
 133.  Jelke Boesten, Women and Conflict: Why We Should Not Separate Rape in 
War from the Everyday Reality of Violence, AFRICA AT LSE (June 13, 2014), 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2014/06/13/women-and-conflict-why-we-should-
not-separate-rape-in-war-from-the-everyday-reality-of-violence/ (advocating the 
importance of addressing both high rates of peacetime and war-related sexual 
violence). 
 134.  See generally MacKinnon, supra note 5, at 9-10 (asserting that rape be 
viewed as genocide). 
 135.  Id. at 9-10. 
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different attacks at once: as simultaneously both a genocidal attack 
and a gendered attack.136 Ultimately, however, rape as genocide 
appears to be the dominant understanding in MacKinnon’s analysis 
of the Bosnian conflict.137 
MacKinnon’s rather radical view of rape as genocide was largely 
confirmed in the ICTR’s Akayesu judgment.138 But for many feminist 
theorists, despite the immediate image of rape being moved up the 
imagined hierarchy to the ultimate harm of genocide, this is not a 
resounding success. Copelon, for example, writing prior to the 
Akayesu judgment, feared that much of the unprecedented attention 
given to rape as genocide in Bosnia was due not necessarily to a 
genocidal particularity of the rape suffered by women in Bosnia, but 
rather “the invisibility of the rape of women in history as well as in 
the present.”139 From Copelon’s perspective, the connection between 
the mass rapes in Bosnia and genocide casts them as distinct from, 
and graver, than other rapes, and thus risks invisibilizing women and 
the specific violence and harms of rape whenever it occurs outside 
the context of genocide.140 This need for rape to be something else in 
order to be systematic, in order to be sufficiently grave, is indicative 
of the sidelining of rape at the ECCC. Genocide is violence to 
destroy a people, whereas rape is sexualized violence intended to 
destroy individual women as women, not as their ethnicity.141 From 
this standpoint, all rape in conflict is systematic, regardless of official 
policy. But Copelon’s rejection of rape as genocide relies, explicitly, 
on rape only ever being about male/female subjugation, to the extent 
that where a man rapes a man, the harm is achieved by the raped man 
being “reduced” to existing as a woman.142 Genocide, says Copelon, 
 136.  Id. at 9-10. 
 137.  Id. at 11-12.   
 138.  See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Judgment, 143 (June 
1, 2001) (affirming a conviction of genocide); cf. Sherrie L. Russell-Brown, Rape 
as an Act of Genocide, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 350, 374 (2003) (noting that rape 
can be used to commit genocide). 
 139.  Copelon, Surfacing Gender, supra note 125, at 244-45.  
 140.  See id. at 245-46 (noting examples whereby rape went largely unreported 
or received little attention and argues that by associating rape only to genocide 
makes rape committed outside of the classic genocidal form invisible).  
 141.  Id. at 246 (“Genocide involves the infliction of all forms of violence to 
destroy a people based on its identity as a people, while rape is sexualized violence 
that seeks to destroy a woman based on her identity as a woman.”). 
 142.  Id. at 246 n.12.   
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elides rape and gender.143 Copelon fears genocidal rape 
exceptionalism and she sees the reiteration and even centering of 
gender as the way to counteract this. And while centering gender 
does risk overly gendering rape, Copelon remains cognizant of the 
hazards of echoing archaic ideas of the “badness” of rape stemming 
from it being an attack against honor.144 
3. From Genocide to Gender 
Russell-Brown is perhaps more willing than Copelon to see an 
intersection between rape and genocide; one that does not necessarily 
risk negating the inherent badness of rape.145 For Russell-Brown, 
gender is not the sole focus because rape can be “a tool of war,” its 
violence coming before its sexual nature.146 Both gender and 
ethnicity are implicated in the use of rape as a tool of war in certain 
contexts, such as Rwanda.147 Russell-Brown views the ICTR’s 
treatment of genocidal rape in Akayesu as striking the correct 
balance, of viewing rape and its harm both as relative to its specific 
Rwandan context, and as an intersectional act able to happen in other 
contexts, “rape as a form of aggression . . . [i]t likened rape to torture 
and it characterized rape as a violation of personal dignity . . . [also] 
as a physical invasion of a sexual nature.”148 But others fear that 
ICTR has in fact created a vertical hierarchy of crimes, in which 
genocide occupies the highest rung.149 This hierarchical 
conceptualization of offenses committed in times of conflict would 
encourage the “feminist vision . . . to move sexual violence crimes up 
 143.  See id. at 246 (arguing that rape and genocide are different atrocities).   
 144.  See id. at 249 (suggesting that rape is fundamentally violence against 
women).  
 145.  See Russell-Brown, supra note 138, at 354, 374 (referring to Akayesu as an 
example of an intersection of genocide and rape). 
 146.  Id. at 352 (alluding to the Rwandan tribunal’s view that rape could be a 
tool of war).  
 147.  Id. at 351-53. 
 148.  Id. at 371; see also Katherine M. Franke, Putting Sex to Work, 75 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 1139, 1143 (1998) (explaining how the gendered nature of crimes 
should be accounted for without essentializing it or applying a reductionist 
approach).  
 149.  See Attila Bogdan, Cumulative Charges, Convictions and Sentencing at 
the Ad Hoc International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 3 
MELB. J. INT’L. L. 1, 32 (2002) (proposing that the ICTR’s judgments demonstrate 
that genocide is “the crime of crimes”).  
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the hierarchy of IHL and ICL criminality.” This would be at odds 
with the alternative feminist approach of separating out sexual 
assaults against women in a horizontal fashion, to be prosecuted in 
their own right, even if that is in addition to prosecution as 
genocide.150 In the starkest depiction, one which never seems to have 
quite been born out in the jurisprudence to date, this is an ideological 
feminist struggle between two feared extremes: one the one hand, the 
subsuming of rape, the invisibilizing of women; and on the other, the 
sequestration of women as victims, with their gender and sexuality as 
sites of particular, immutable harm. In this way, focusing on gender 
could lead to regression, rather than progress, in the conceptualizing 
of women and rape within international criminal law. 
4. Rape as Gendered 
Reviewing the jurisprudence of the ECCC revealed a dearth of 
consideration of how women in particular suffered under the Khmer 
Rouge, and this stood in stark contrast to the Women’s Hearing, 
which was created to remedy this very deficit.151 But, the ECCC’s 
lack of engagement with the ways in which rape harms women in 
ostensibly particular ways, can be seen as a stimulus for 
reconsidering whether focusing on the gendered aspects of rape in 
conflict helps or hinders.152 “Surfacing gender” risks being realized 
as a distinguishing of gender identity and sexual autonomy as a site 
for incomparable harm, reserved exclusively to women. In 
condemning sexual violence against women, there is a risk of 
elevating its significance. As Professor Janet Halley proposes, “the 
intensive and specific prohibition of rape can weaponise it.”153 The 
corollary of this is that rape becomes  somehow graver than all other 
harms, or at the very least significantly distinct in the harm it causes. 
Treating rape as “inherently comparative,” necessitates a certain 
experience of the harm of rape from all victims—for rape to be the 
worst harm.154 But a person experiencing wartime rape may be more 
 150.  Halley, supra note 103, at 83.  
 151.  CAMBODIAN DEFENDERS PROJECT, supra note 1, at 1.  
 152.  This is not to say that the ECCC intended to promote critical reflection on 
these issues. To the contrary, many parts of the ECCC appear quick to close down 
progressive work on gender and rape. E.g., supra note 58.   
 153.  Halley, supra note 103, at 115. 
 154.  See id. at 112 (quoting the protagonist of the diary whom Halley employs 
to illustrate the rather more complex response women have toward rape in war: 
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angered by starvation, by displacement, by even the most mundane 
banalities of life, than by their personal experience of rape. This does 
not negate the wrongdoing of the rapist, but it does call into question, 
as Halley deftly explores, the understanding of the harm of rape that 
underlies the international legal response of recent decades.155 
Another risk of treating sexual violence as inherently gendered is 
that it could result in a failure to understand such violence as 
anything other than a “reproduc[tion] [of] the dynamics of male-on-
female (sexual) violence.”156 But is rape simply binary gender 
dynamics realized through physical violence? Is it a profoundly 
damaging psychological attack on a woman as a woman?157 Outside 
of the ECCC, the Women’s Hearing acknowledged that sexual 
crimes were most definitely also committed against men during this 
time. But the Women’s Hearing also conceded that there is little 
research on the impact such violence had on men, and reports from 
the Hearing also note that the Khmer Rouge’s Moral Codes made no 
attempt to regulate same-sex relationships or sexual violence..158 
More glaringly, the Cambodian experience wholly and seemingly 
willfully refuses to engage with the idea implicit in the outrage 
engendered my forced marriage—it forces a man to rape his wife.159 
In cases of sexual intercourse entered into on fear of death, it is at 
once far too simplistic and largely illogical to imply that women 
were victims while men were not. 
Feminist concerns as to the gendering of rape and differentiating 
of women’s experiences of harm160 often relate to fears that this 
“[i]t [rape] sounds like the absolute worst, the end of everything—but it’s not.”).  
 155.  See id. (referring to the German rape victims’ emotional side of rape who 
begged to be shot and committed suicide).  
 156.  Engle, supra note 6, at 815. 
 157.  See Copelon, Surfacing Gender, supra note 125, at 252 ( “Rape attacks the 
integrity of the woman as a person as well as her identity as a woman . . . . [R]ape 
is both a profound physical attack and a particularly egregious form of 
psychological torture.”).  
 158.  CAMBODIAN DEFENDERS PROJECT, supra note 1, at 4.  
 159.  See THERESA DE LANGIS ET AL., LIKE GHOST CHANGES BODY: A STUDY 
ON THE IMPACT OF FORCED MARRIAGE UNDER THE KHMER ROUGE REGIME 102 
(2014) (asserting that the instituted policy of forced marriage perpetuates a culture 
of rape and abuse).  
 160.  See generally Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Exploring a Feminist Theory of Harm 
in the Context of Conflicted and Post-Conflict Societies, 35 QUEEN’S L.J. 219, 219 
(2009) (arguing that a feminist theory of harm is necessary to respond effectively 
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portrays women as perpetual victims, lacking agency by virtue of the 
very presence of war. Additionally, feminists have expressed 
concerns that it furthers the same logic that cast women as men’s 
property, as a means of attacking the male enemy in war, or of the 
concept of women as belonging, certainly in war, to the category of 
“women and children”161—unable to play an active role, even in 
terms of their own physicality and sexual acts, and dependent upon 
men for their role in the war, whichever side the men may come 
from. Karen Engle has suggested that this may in fact work to 
deprive women of any power they do have.162 Yet it is not only 
women that the gendered vision of rape harms, as the absence of any 
redress for the specific harms experienced by men in forced marriage 
in Cambodia attests.163 Feminist explanations of the women soldiers 
at Abu Ghraib sexually assaulting male prisoners as a furtherance of 
male/female subjugation, either by women acting as men and men 
being treated as women, or women being manipulated by the men 
who do retain power, is not only an injustice to the victims,164 but 
relies on a denial of women’s power, arguably rooted in the way in 
which rape has been addressed in the international legal system, 
influenced greatly by feminists.165 Almost twenty years after 
feminism mobilized to prosecute rape, the feminist response to the 
sexual torture of male prisoners at Abu Ghraib, especially where it 
was at the hands of women soldiers, shows what Ahmed describes as 
the “blindspot” of feminism’s desire to view all sexual violence as an 
to the experiences of women). 
 161.  See generally Engle, supra note 6, at 779-80, 810-16 (relaying the 
experiences of women in war to suggest women as being a distinct category from 
men). 
 162.  Id. at 812. 
 163.  For example, the ECCC has not (yet) considered the very particular 
suffering, and any subsequent PTSD, that may have been experienced by men who 
found themselves struggling as both victim and, to some extent, perpetrator, e.g., 
men who raped their new wives because if they did not they may both have been 
killed. See generally KASUMI NAKAGAWA, GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE DURING THE 
KHMER ROUGE REGIME (2d ed. 2008) (providing various accounts of forced 
marriage in which death was the threatened punishment for those forced marriage 
couples who did not engage in sex with one another).  
 164.  Aziza Ahmed, When Men Are Harmed: Feminism, Queer Theory, and 
Torture at Abu Ghraib, 11 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 1, 8-10 (2012).  
 165.  See Engle, supra note 6, at 813 (suggesting that the success of feminists of 
calling international attention to rape relies on some denial of women’s power).   
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incarnation of male/female subordination.166 The need for feminism 
and international law to both recognize the gendered and the un-
gendered nature of rape in conflict looms large on the horizon. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In mapping some of the many strands of the diverse efforts to 
forefront prosecution of rape in international law, I hope to have cast 
some light on the ways in which the approach continues to fall short 
and perhaps has caused harm itself, albeit in unintended ways.167 If 
the ECCC had availed of the jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR, 
and the hard won understanding of rape as a crime deserving 
prosecution as such, there may well have been some justice rendered 
for many victims of rape under the Khmer Rouge. But, as has been 
illustrated, the international law response to rape since the 1970s has 
not resulted in a panacea for rape prosecution and certainly not for 
rapes that occurred prior to the 1990s. 
The principle of legality and the demands of chapeau elements and 
modes of responsibility remain is the technical bar to justice for 
women at the ECCC, and it will likely be recorded as the definitive 
reason for the notable absence of rape prosecutions at the Court. But, 
in truth, victims of rape and sexual violence under the Khmer Rouge 
are left without formal redress for a number of reasons far bigger 
than just a legal technicality.168 Primarily, the international legal 
order has for too long failed to work for women, as the gendered 
nature of both peremptory norms and customary international law 
attests.169 Secondly, the political will to achieve justice for 
Cambodia’s victims of rape and sexual assault is lacking on both the 
immediate level, among a number of actors at the ECCC,170 and 
 166.  Ahmed, supra note 164, at 9-11.   
 167.  See, e.g., Askin, supra note 4, at 288-89 (emphasizing how the 
development of international law neglected to take women and girls into account).   
 168.  See CAMBODIAN DEFENDERS PROJECT, supra note 1, at 5 (stressing that 
under ECCC law for sexual crimes to be prosecuted, they need to be subsumed 
under the crime of torture). 
 169.  Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 78, at 75 (concluding that 
international human rights principles are male oriented and given a masculine 
interpretation).  
 170.  Although the Co-Lawyers for Civil Parties have worked hard to 
foreground rape at the ECCC, and the prosecution have also made some efforts, 
the Supreme Court Chamber (Case 001 Appeal)  and the Office of the Co-
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seemingly the broader international community, and among so many 
of the feminist theorists who were so eager to influence the 
jurisprudence of the ICTY.171 Finally, a firm understanding of the 
harm of rape, of the conceptual basis of its prosecution, especially in 
contexts of conflict remains absent, or at least too incoherent to be 
powerful. 
The various constructions of rape to date—rape as genocide, rape 
as torture, gendered rape, sexualized rape, even rape simply as 
rape—have struggled to gain a conceptual foothold that can 
withstand the myriad realities of rape in conflict.172 For every 
permutation of the definition and prosecution of rape in conflict in 
international law, there has been a plethora of responses—both 
positive and critical.173 The cleaving of rape in the context of forced 
marriage from all other rapes at the ECCC is perhaps the latest in 
attempts to define and conceptualize not the particular harms of rape, 
but the particular rapes that harm. Jurisprudence from the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone174 and the response to the ICC’s Katanaga175 
ruling would certainly seem to suggest the intersection of rape and 
forced marriage as a burgeoning point of divergence,176 further 
Investigating Judges(Case 002 Closing Order) have been the source of significant 
challenges to the efforts of the aforementioned sections.  
 171.  See Engle, supra note 6, at 778.   
 172.  See Pearce, supra note 120, at 539 (advocating for rape as torture); 
Russell-Brown, supra note 138, at 350 (advocating for rape as a genocide). 
 173.  See also Pearce, supra note 120, at 560 (showing that more needs to 
change at the procedural level to prosecute rape and sexual violence); Russell-
Brown, supra note 138, at 373 (discussing the debate surrounding genocidal rape). 
See generally Engle, supra note 6, at 815 (responding to early disagreements over 
the treatment of rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
 174.  See Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Judgment, 105-06 
(Feb. 22, 2008) (holding that forced marriage itself could constitute the crime 
against humanity of an other inhumane act and need not depend on classification 
as sexual slavery).  
 175.  See generally Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Order 
Instructing the Registry to Report on Applications for Reparations (Aug. 27, 2014).  
 176.  Case 002/02 at the ECCC should see decisions made as to whether rape is 
or is not a required element of forced marriage. The Civil Party Co-Lead Lawyers 
have submitted Investigative Requests which argue, inter alia, that forced marriage 
may amount to the crimes against humanity of other inhumane acts, enslavement, 
forced pregnancy, and/or rape. This suggests that, from the point of view of the 
Civil Parties, not all forced marriages would need to involve rape, and that where 
rape was carried out within forced marriage, the rape amounts to a discrete crime 
against humanity, “[a]separate count  falling under article 5 of the ECCC law, as 
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complicating the question of whether the prosecution of rape at the 
international level in recent decades has been progress enough, or 
even progress at all.177 
What is needed is a revised conceptualization of rape, 
reconciliation between rape qua rape and rape as constitutive of 
crimes such as torture and genocide, and, crucially, a more 
theoretically secure understanding of the numerous harms it can 
inflict (and the ways in which it may not do the harm we expect).178 
MacKinnon’s identifying of the difficulty in reconciling both the 
particular and the general in international law goes a long way to 
explaining the struggles inherent in trying to ensure that the law 
delivers justice for women,179 requiring an understanding of women’s 
experiences and of the harms they experience through rape. , But 
achieving this greatly risks essentializing women. Not all women’s 
lives are the same, especially in the context of providing transitional 
justice for women post-conflict. While the law often neglects many 
of the ways in which women experience harm, it would also be a 
grave injustice to imply that all women must experience harm in 
certain, gendered ways. The challenge for International Criminal 
Law, and for the feminist legal scholars who seek to influence this 
field, is to legislate and prosecute acts of sexual violence while 
crimes against humanity of rape.” Co-Lawyers for Civil Parties, Second Request 
for Investigative Actions Concerning Forced Marriages and Forced Sexual 
Relations, Case File No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ, Doc. D188, ¶ 25 
(Extraordinary Chambers Cts. Cambodia, July 15, 2009). In addition to hashing 
out the elements of forced marriage, Case 002/02 will also be an opportunity to 
clarify the form forced marriage should take as a crime against humanity. For 
discussion of this issue outside of the ECCC’s Case 002/02. See generally Frances 
Nguyen, Emerging Voices: Taking Forced Marriage Out of the “Other Inhumane 
Acts” Box, OPINIO JURIS (July 31, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/07/ 
31/emerging-voices-taking-forced-marriage-out-of-the-other-inhumane-acts-box/ 
(demonstrating that even though the Special Court for Sierra Leone has upheld 
convictions of forced marriage as crimes against humanity in later cases, the 
general consensus remains that there is a lack of case law to support such 
prosecutions of forced marriage as distinct crimes against humanity in their own 
right).  
 177.  See Engle, supra note 6, at 780 (arguing that the criminalization of rape is 
neither as path-breaking nor as progressive as recognition suggests). 
 178.  See id.  
 179.  MacKinnon, supra note 5, at 142 (“What happens to women is either too 
particular to be universal or too universal to be particular, meaning either too 
human to be female or too female to be human.”). 
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allowing for a nuanced representation both of women and of sexual 
relations in times of conflict. Halley effectively, albeit uncomfortably 
for those seeking a presentation of women as uncomplicated 
perpetual victims, illustrates this point in Rape in Berlin, wherein 
consent and coercion are not as clear cut as most international 
lawyers would like to imagine.180  The important fact of different 
realities and harms experienced by women is so often obscured by a 
failure to include the voices of feminists from outside the West, 
whose social, economic, and cultural particularities feminist 
academia so often glosses over in its effort to secure recognition of 
women as a uniform class in international law.181 
Underlying this, however, is a need to address the role of gender 
both within rape, and within international law more generally, as 
well as the challenge of developing law that carries expressive force 
in the condemnation of rape182 without essentializing and thus further 
perpetuating women’s sexuality as a site of particular harm183 and 
simultaneously occluding men’s bodies as a site of sexual harm.184 In 
focusing attention on women there is a danger to exclude, or even 
deny, the rape and sexual violence suffered by men in times of 
conflict. In her exploration of the proposition presented by queer 
theory, that “feminism’s reliance on male/female subordination has 
the potential to not only obscure harm in times of war but also to 
perpetuate it,” Ahmed brings to light both the sexual violence 
experienced by men at the hands of women and the disappointing 
ways in which dominant elements of legal feminism have sought to 
 180.  See Halley, supra note 103, at 111 (relaying an account of a woman’s 
experience of sexual violence).  
 181.  See Karen Engle, International Human Rights and Feminisms: When 
Discourses Keep Meeting, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: MODERN FEMINIST 
APPROACHES 47, 48 (Doris Buss & Ambreena Manji eds., 2005) (arguing against 
structural bias feminism, which obscures economic, social, and cultural differences 
between first and third world women).  
 182.  See Fiona O’Regan, Prosecutor vs. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo: The 
Cumulative Charging Principle, Gender-Based Violence, and Expressivism, 43 
GEO. J. INT’L L. 1323, 1351-1360 (2012) (discussing the expressive force of 
international law in signaling (“expressing”) the condemnation of rape).  
 183.  See id. at 1357-59 (discussing the dangers of essentializing women’s 
sexuality in prosecuting rape).  
 184.  See generally Ruth Graham, Male Rape and the Careful Construction of 
the Male Victim, 15 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 187, 188, 202 (2006) (reviewing the 
academic discourse of male rape).  
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mask it as a either women acting as men or men being treated as 
women.185 
This ultimately sets the stage for a more fundamental questioning 
of our understanding of harm and how this is expressed through law. 
This more developed understanding of rape will not be easy to reach, 
and the jurisprudence may show that rape in conflict will always be 
somewhat tied to context186 be that genocide in Rwanda, or forced 
marriage in Cambodia. But we must develop a more nuanced 
understanding of why rape harms at all, even before applying this 
theory in a more contextualized fashion. A more advanced 
conception of women, of gender, and of rape is essential if 
transitional justice is to be a comprehensive means of moving 
forwards, healing harms, and ensuring a lasting peace for not only a 
nation, but the individuals of which it consists. 
 
 185.  Ahmed, supra note 164, at 3 (recounting the sexual violence experienced 
by men at the hands of women soldiers in the Abu Ghraib prison). 
 186.  The Appeals Chamber in Brima seems cognizant of the limitation of 
context in International Criminal Law, as it caveats its ruling on the definition of 
forced marriage with, “the Appeals Chamber finds that in the context of the Sierra 
Leone conflict, forced marriage describes a situation in which. . . [emphasis 
added].” But generally in International Criminal Law, the limitations of context 
risk being forgotten, as tribunals seek to draw on the jurisprudence of one another, 
especially regarding developing or contentious issues, such as forced marriage. See 
Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Judgment, ¶ 196 (Feb. 22, 2008). 
 
